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Abstract—This paper studies the transmit antenna selection
based on machine learning (ML) schemes in untrusted relay net-
works. First, we state the conventional antenna selection scheme.
Then, we implement three ML schemes, namely, the support vector
machine-based scheme, the naive-Bayes-based scheme, and the
k-nearest neighbors-based scheme, which are applied to select
the best antenna with the highest secrecy rate. The simulation
results are presented in terms of system secrecy rate and secrecy
outage probability. From the simulation, we can conclude that
the proposed ML-based antenna selection schemes can achieve
the same performance without amplification at the relay, or small
performance degradation with transmitted power constraint at
the relay, comparing with conventional schemes. However, when
the training is completed, the proposed schemes can perform the
antenna selection with a small computational complexity.
Index Terms—transmit antenna selection, untrusted relay net-
works, support vector machine, naive-Bayes, k-nearest neighbors
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, wireless communication network has become an
indispensable part of civilian life and military applications.
In order to meet the demand for high quality communication
services, there are many emerging wireless technologies such as
massive MIMO, millimeter wave communications and machine
type communication, etc. [1]–[3]. In order to ensure private
and important information transmission, physical layer security
is the state-of-the-art technique for future wireless networks.
Transmit antenna selection (TAS) is an efficient scheme to guar-
antee the high spectral efficiency and overcome the hardware
energy consumption in communication environments [4], [5].
On the other hand, in recent years, machine learning(ML)
schemes have attracted a lot of attention for applications
in wireless communications, such as support vector machine
(SVM) [6], k-nearest neighbors (k-NN) [7] and naive-Bayes
(NB) [8], which demonstrate the superior performance on
multiclass classification. ML schemes can be combined with
TAS to classify the channel state information (CSI) and obtain
the best selected antenna which can achieve the highest system
secrecy rate and reduce computation of complexity.
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Cooperative jamming [9], cooperative relay [10] and other
jamming schemes have been widely employed in wiretap com-
munication networks, since it helps protecting the networks
from eavesdropper attacks and guaranteeing the secure com-
munication between the source and the destination, thereby
improving the physical layer security.
In this paper, we apply the ML-based TAS in the untrusted
relay network, aiming to enhance the physical layer security
and reducing the computational complexity. We first construct
the system model and signal model with consideration of TAS.
Then, the ML-based TAS for the untrusted relay network is de-
veloped, where k-NN, NB and SVM algorithms are considered.
Finally, the simulated secrecy rate, secrecy outage probability
(SOP) and misclassification rate for the conventional transverse
algorithm and ML-based algorithm are presented and compared.
II. SYSTEM AND SIGNAL MODEL
As shown in Fig.1, we consider cooperative jamming in
untrusted relay networks, which consists of a source (S), a
destination (D) and an untrusted amplifying-and-forward (AF)
relay (R). All the nodes, S, R, and D, are equipped with
NS, NR, ND antennas, respectively. For simplicity, we assume
NR = ND = 1 for our initial work. In the untrusted relay
network, we assume the relay is untrustworthy, and works
in time-division multiple-access (TDMA) mode and a half-
duplex two-hop relaying. Only the source S employed the TAS
schemes. In addition, all channels are subject to independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d) Rayleigh fading.
Fig. 1. cooperative jamming in untrusted relay network
In this model, due to shadowing or too long distance, there
is no direct link between S and D, thus the communication
between S and D is implemented via R. We denote h =
[h1, · · · , hNS ] ∈ C1×NS as the channel vector from S to R.
Further define gR−D ∈ C1×1 and gD−R ∈ C1×1 as the channel
gains from R to D and from D to R. Here, since the channel
reciprocity is considered in this paper, we have gR−D = g
∗
R−D.
And let gR−D = g for simple representation. As regarding
the high cost of RF chain, in this system, only NT antennas
among NS of S are activated to perform transmission. Assume
the available NS antennas are labeled as 1, 2, · · · , NS and
the selected NT antennas are with the indices s1, s2, · · · , sNT
where sj ∈ [1, NS] for j = 1, · · · , NT. Therefore, the practical
propagation channel from S to R can be denoted as h˜ =[
hs1 , · · · , hsNT
]
∈ C1×NT . In order to maximize the received
SNR for the relay R and thus the destination D, matched filter
precoding is applied. In this case, the precoding vector for S’s
transmission is pMF =
h˜
H
‖h˜‖2
, where ‖·‖2 represents the 2 norm
of a vector.
Owing to the untrusted relay, we adopted the destination-
aided jamming (DAJ) technique [11], [12] and implement the
transmission in two time-slots.
In the first time slot, S transmits its precoded signal, PMFxS,
and meanwhile D transmits cooperative jamming signal xJ to
the untrusted relay R. The received signal at R, yR, is given by
[12], [13]
yR =
√
PS
NT
h˜pMFxS +
√
PDgD−RxJ + nR
=
√
PS
NT
‖h˜‖2xS +
√
PDgxJ + nR, (1)
where xS and xJ denote the confidential signal and cooperative
jamming signal with unit power, i.e., |xS| = |xJ| = 1;
PS and PD are the transmitted powers for confidential and
cooperative jamming signals, respectively; nR denotes the
complex additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) received at
R, following CN (0, N0)-distribution. In this paper, we assume
all the AWGNs received at R in the first time slot and at D in
the second time slot are both with unit power spectral density
(PSD), that is, N0 = 1. As a result, the signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) at different nodes can be adjusted by the transmitted
power. With the cooperative jamming signal as the second item
in (1), the interpretation of xS by R is degraded.
From (1), the instantaneous received signal-to-interference-
plus-noise ratio (SINR) at R can be presented as
γR =
PS
NT
‖h˜‖22
(PD|g|2 + 1) . (2)
In the second time slot, the relay R re-transmits the received
signals to D after amplifying it with amplification factor β. Let
PR be the transmitted power by R. Therefore, with yR in (1),
the amplification factor β must satisfy the following equation
β2 =
PR
PS
NT
‖h˜‖22 + PD|g|2 + 1
. (3)
Then the received signal at D from the untrusted relay is
given by
yD = βgR−D
√
PS
NT
‖h˜‖22xS + βgR−D
√
PDgD−RxJ
+ βgR−DnR + nD, (4)
where nD is the complex AWGN received at D, which is also
assumed to be CN (0, 1)-distributed.
Since the second item in (4) is transmitted by D itself, D
can perform self-interference cancellation with perfect channel
state information (CSI) available. Consequently, the received
signal at D in (4) can be rewritten as
yD = βg
∗
√
PS
NT
‖h˜‖22xS + βg∗nR + nD. (5)
And from (5), the instantaneous SINR at D can be presented
as
γD =
PS
NT
β2‖h˜‖22|g|2
β2|g|2 + 1 . (6)
In the physical-layer security based untrusted relay system,
the achievable secrecy rate can be defined as [11], [12], [14]
Rs = [log2(1 + γD)− log2(1 + γR)]+ , (7)
where [·]+ = max(·, 0). Note that, for simplification, we neglect
this operator for the following derivation but consider it for
simulation.
With (2) and (6), we can formulate the secrecy rate in (7)
after some calculation as
Rs = log2
(
PS
NT
‖h˜‖22
PD|g|2 + 1
×
PS
NT
PR|g|2‖h˜‖22 + PR|g|2 + PSNT ‖h˜‖22 + PD|g|2 + 1
PR|g|2 + PSNT ‖h˜‖22 + PD|g|2 + 1
)
.
(8)
From (8) and considering ‖h˜‖22 =
∑NT
j=1 |hsj |2, Rs has a
very complicated coupling relationship with h˜ and g, which
makes the antenna selection difficult to solve.
In the following part, we further consider three special and
simplified scenarios.
A. Special Case 1: No Amplification at R
In this case, β2 = 1; as a result, the achievable secrecy rate
in (8), Rs, can be simplified as
Rs = log2
(
PS
NT
‖h˜‖22
PD|g|2 + 1 ×
PS
NT
|g|2‖h˜‖22 + |g|2 + 1
|g|2 + 1
)
. (9)
In (9), only the nominator has relationship with h˜, which
contributes to the correctness and simplification for the antenna
selection.
B. Special Case 2: Only One Selected Antenna
In this case, we can select only one antenna, namely hs,
to implement the transmission. Therefore, ‖h˜‖22 can be further
denoted as |hs|22. And the achievable secrecy rate in (8), Rs,
can be reformulated as
Rs = log2
(
PS|hs|22
PD|g|2 + 1
× PSPR|g|
2|hs|22 + PR|g|2 + PS|hs|22 + PD|g|2 + 1
PR|g|2 + PS|hs|22 + PD|g|2 + 1
)
.
(10)
C. Special Case 3: No Amplification at R and Only One
Selected Antenna
By combining the considerations in Special Cases 1 and 2,
the Rs in (8) can be rewritten as
Rs = log2
(
PS|hs|22
PD|g|2 + 1 ×
PS|g|2|hs|22 + |g|2 + 1
|g|2 + 1
)
. (11)
III. CONVENTIONAL ANTENNA SELECTION SCHEME
In conventional antenna selection scheme, the source S is
aware of all CSIs, such as h and g. Then, S traverses all
possible combinations for selected antennas, and computes the
corresponding secrecy rate. The maximum secrecy rate and the
corresponding antenna selection scheme are the solution for the
consideration of this paper. The optimization problem can be
formulated as
n∗ = argmax
n∈L
Rs, (12)
where L denote the index set for all possible combinations for
selected antennas, with size CNTNS =
NS!
NT!(NS−NT)!
.
Besides secrecy rate defined in (7), SOP is another indicator
to evaluate the system performance, which is defined as
Pout(Rt) = P(Rs < Rt), (13)
where P(·) is the probability, Rt is the target SOP. In the
simulation part, we will present the performance comparison
for different antenna selection scheme with the two indicator,
secrecy rate and SOP.
IV. MACHINE LEARNING-BASED TRANSMIT ANTENNA
SELECTION SCHEMES
In this section, we apply ML schemes, namely, SVM, NB and
k-NN, into TAS scheme in an untrusted relay network. After
feature vectors is generated, we construct the ML classification
models. Based on the indicator in (8), we can get class label of
training CSI samples, and the class label can be as a index to
select current best channel or channel combination. By inputting
the training CSI samples and corresponding class labels to these
ML models, we can predict the class labels of the new CSI
samples.
A. Construct training data sets
Before the ML models construction, we perform three-step
procedure to construct training data sets [15].
(1) Preprocessing with Training Data Sets: Preprocessing
data sets are mainly to generate the input variables of ML
system. Now, we obtain M CSI samples as training data
sets which is [(hm1 , g
m
1 ), (h
m
2 , g
m
2 ), · · · , (hmM , gmM )]. Then, we
should do the preprocessing with the training data sets. The
preprocessing process can be divided to 3 steps:
Step1: From (8)-(11), we can discover that the absolute
values of channel gains of both hi and g determine the antenna
selection. Therefore, in this paper, to construct the feature vec-
tor, we generate a 1×N real vector, dm, for m ∈ {1, · · · ,M}
and N = NS + 1, which can be denoted as
dm =
[|hm1 |, · · · , |hmNS |, |gm|] , (14)
where hmi denote the i-th element of the m-th channel sample,
hm, for i = 1, · · · , NS and m = 1, · · · ,M .
Step2: Repeat Step1 forM times, and we can getM training
feature vectors, i.e., d1,d2, · · · ,dM .
Step3: Generate 1 × N normalized feature vector tm by
normalizing dm. The i-th element of tm, tmi , can be generated
as
tmi =
dmi − E[dm]
max(dm)−min(dm) , (15)
where dmi is the i-th element of d
m.
(2) KPI Design: In this paper, maximizing system secrecy
rate is the target. Therefore, we configure secrecy rate originally
defined in (8) as the key performance indicator (KPI).
(3) Labeling: Calculate KPI of each antenna, then we get
the M channel labels as an index of target antenna that can
maximize the KPI.
B. Building Learning Models
With the normalized feature vectors in (15) and its corre-
sponding labels, we can build a learning model, whose input is
the CSI samples and output is the classified label corresponding
to the index of the selected antenna in the set L. In this paper,
we adopt three ML models, namely, SVM, NB, and k-NN.
(1) SVM-Based Model
The SVM is to construct a hyper-plane or many hyper-
planes in a high dimensional space, which can be used for
classification. The SVM has 2 classifier model construction
methods, namely, OVR (one-vs.-rest) and OVO (one-vs.-one).
In this paper, we adopt OVR method to construct the SVM
model. And the logistic regression problem can be solved by
the presented formula
wl = argmin
wl
C
M∑
m=1
[bl[m]g1(w
T
l f(t
m))]
+ argmin
wl
C
M∑
m=1
[(1 − bl[m])× g0(wTl f(tm))]
+ ‖wl‖22 /2 (16)
where wl ∈ RM×1 , l ∈ {1, 2, ..., Ns} is a learning parameter
vector; The Radial Basis Function (RBF) kernel has two
parameters, C and f(tm). Choice of C and f(tm) plays
an important role in the SVMs performance. C is a penalty
factor, which trades off misclassification of training examples
against simplicity of the decision surface. f(tm) ∈ R1×N is
another kernel parameter which denotes how far the influence
of a single training example reaches, and its n-th element can
be expressed as fn(t
m) = exp(−‖tm − tn‖ /(2σ2)) with σ
representing the variance of f(tm); if the m-th training CSI’s
label is equal to l, bl[m] = 1, otherwise, bl[m] = 0; the
gk(n) = max((−1)kn+ 1, 0) is the cost function.
After the wl is obtained, the SVM’s model can conduct
antenna selection. We generate a set of new nomalized feature
vectors tm as described in Section IV-A and input them to the
SVM’s model. The current CSI label can be obtained by using
t to replace tm, thus the l∗ antenna with largestwTl f(t) among
all classes can be selected.
(2) NB-Based Model
The construction of NB-based model is based on conditional
probability. In this paper, the NB classifier calculate the con-
ditional probability for each feature vector t assigning to all
label classes.
The posterior probability for the normalized feature vector t
belonging to the class l can be expressed as [16]
P(l|t) =P(l)P(t|l)
P(t)
=
P(l)
P(t)
N∏
n=1
P(tn|l) (17)
where l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , NS}, n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, P(t|l) is the
class-conditional probability of occurrence of the feature vector
t given the class l, P(l) is prior probability, P(t) is the
occurrence probability of feature vector t, tn is the n-th element
of t. According to (17), we can obtain the antenna label which
achieving the maximal posterier probability when the feature
vector is t.
We note that the prior probability P(t) is irrevelant with class
label and P(l) is a constant for all classes, so P(t) and P(l)
has no effect on antenna selection. As such, we can remove
no influential terms. Thus, the (17) can be simplified in order
to obtain maximal posterier occurrence probability of feature
vector t. This formula is presented as
l∗ = argmax
l∈{1,2,...,NS}
N∏
n=1
P(tn|l) (18)
Where l∗ reprents the selected antenna. We note that the NB-
based model can conduct antenna selection after P(tn|l) is
obtained. The NB model will output a antenna label after
inputting a new CSI feature vector t.
(3) k-NN Based Model
We note that we get the CSI samples and their corresponding
labels before model construction. The k-NN classifier calculates
the Euclidian distance between new channel feature vectors and
the training channel feature vectors. The k-NN classifier assign
the label to the new CSI feature vectors if there is a minimal
Euclidian distance between the new and training channel. The
Euclidean distance can be expresssed as
D(t, tm) = ‖tm − t‖2 (19)
where the tm is the training normalized CSI feature vector, t
is the new CSI feature vector.
According to (19), we can obtain the new label of CSI feature
vector which has corresponding minimal Euclidean distance.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we present some simulation results to verify
the efficiency of the ML-based schemes. We set the training
and testing sets for M = 10000 channel implementations.
The source S is configured with NS = 6 antennas. In this
simulation, NT = 1 or 2 antennas will be selected out of
the available NS = 6 antennas. For simplicity, the confidential
and cooperative jamming signals are transmitted with the same
power, that is, PS = PD. When considering amplification at R,
we further have PS = PD = PR; otherwise, when β
2 = 1, no
constraint is preformed on PR.
Note that, in the following simulation results, we use solid
lines and dot-dash lines to present the single and two antenna
selection cases, respectively.
A. System Performance
Fig. 2 shows the achievable secrecy rate of different single
or two antenna selection schemes at different SNRs for β2 6= 1.
From Fig. 2, we can discover that the secrecy rate increases for
all schemes as the SNR increases. The secrecy rate achieved
by ML-based schemes has the same trend as that achieved by
conventional scheme but with a small degradation. From (8)
and (10), the achievable secrecy rate, Rs, has a complicated
coupling relationship with the selected channel gain h˜, which
is difficult for the considered ML algorithm to thoroughly
decouple. As a result, some misclassifications are emerged. This
fact contributes the degradation. For decoupling the complicated
relationship, we will employ Deep Learning model to shrink
the gap as our future work. Then, consider the number of
selected antennas, the secrecy rate for single antenna selection
is higher than that for two antenna selection. It is because that
for single antenna selection, all power possessed by S is used
to transmit the confidential signal through the only strongest
channel. Whereas, for two antenna selection, half of the power
is shared to the second strongest channel, which has smaller
gain than the strongest one.
In Fig. 3, we further plot the achievable secrecy rate of
different single or two antenna selection schemes at different
SNRs for β2 = 1. Comparing the results in Figs. 2 and 3,
the achievable secrecy rate for β2 = 1 shares the same trend
with that for β2 6= 1. However, the gap between conventional
and ML-based TAS schemes is diminished. Considering the
secrecy rate in (8), (9) and (11), the selected channel gains just
have impact on the nominator for β2 = 1. This significantly
reduce the complexity and couple, which make the ML-based
TAS scheme predict the best selection precisely. Consequently,
the ML-based TAS schemes achieve the same secrecy rate as
conventional scheme.
As stated in (13), SOP is another indicator for physical layer
security system. In Fig.4 and Fig. 5, we plot the SOP at different
SNRs for Rt = 2 bps/Hz and β
2 6= 1 or β2 = 1, respectively.
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Fig. 2. Secrecy rate of single and two antenna selection for β2 6= 1
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Fig. 3. Secrecy rate of single and two antenna selection for β2 = 1
From Fig. 4 and 5, SOP of all TAS schemes decreases as the
SNR increases for both cases of β2 6= 1 or β2 = 1. Owing to
the same reason in previous paragraph, our proposed schemes
almost have the same SOP as the conventional scheme for β2 =
1, while they degrade a little in terms of SOP for β 6= 1. The
SOP of single antenna selection scheme is lower than that of
two antenna selection scheme.
Observing Figs. 2-5 in detail, we can discover that, for
β2 6= 1, k-NN based TAS scheme achieves the best perfor-
mance, while SVM and NB based schemes obtain relatively
worse performance, in terms of both secrecy rate and SOP. We
analyze the reasons as follows. As stated previously, the KPI,
secrecy rate, has a complicated coupling relationship with the
channel gain vector, h, which is difficult to be decoupled. SVM
is a deterministic classification scheme. When solving a com-
plicated coupling relationship, SVM has a difficulty to extract
feature vectors and construct precise hyper-planes, which result
in some misclassification. Similarly, for NB-based scheme, its
high deviation makes the probabilistic estimation not accurate.
However, the k-NN based scheme relies on neighbor data sets
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Fig. 4. SOP of single and two antenna selection for β2 6= 1 and Rt = 2
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Fig. 5. The SOP of single and two antennas selection for β2 = 1 and Rt =
2 bps/Hz
and has low deviation with sufficient samples; therefore, it can
construct better classification in this scenario.
B. Computational Complexity
In this subsection, we compare the computational complexity
for our proposed ML-based schemes and conventional scheme.
As stated in Section III, |L| presents the number of selected
antenna combinations, and |L| = CNTNS = NS!NT!(NS−NT)! . Let
N = NS + 1. The selection complexity for SVM, NB, k-NN
and conventional schemes are O(N2), O(|L|N + |L| log |L|),
O(N) and O(N + |L| log |L|), respectively [15], [16]. We
can clearly see that the ML schemes is rather lower that of
conventional schemes. It is because that the conventional TAS
scheme requires to process the global search and comparison
for each antenna combination. However, the complexity of
ML-based schemes relies on the prediction complexity rather
than the training complexity because the model training can be
performed offline.
C. Classification Performance
Actually, the TAS is equivalent to a classification system
with ML algorithm. In this subsection, we present the misclas-
sification rate for single antenna selection by using the web
representation [17] for β2 = 1 or β2 6= 1, SNR = 15 dB. The
value of each point in polygon denotes the misclassification rate
of the corresponding channel index by l → l, where l, l ∈ L
and l 6= l. It can be seen that the misclassification rate for
β2 6= 1 is higher than the rate for β2 = 1. The critical reason
is that, for β2 6= 1, the secrecy rate has a complicated couple
in (10), which cause the ML algorithm cannot well decouple;
as a result, classification performance is degraded.
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Fig. 6. Misclassification rate for single antenna selection for β2 6= 1.
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Fig. 7. Misclassification rate for single antenna selection for β2 = 1.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we applied ML algorithms for the antenna
selection in untrusted relay networks to guarantee the perfor-
mance as well as reducing the complexity. After pre-processing
the training data sets, we constructed the SVM, NB and k-
NN ML-based models to classify the CSI, which can be used
to select the best antenna combination. The simulation results
demonstrate that the ML-based TAS schemes can achieve
almost the same performance as the conventional scheme.
However, when amplification power constraint at the relay
is considered, the complicated coupling relationship brings
out some misclassification and thus degrades the achievable
performance. For the case, we plan to introduce deep learning
based scheme to decouple the relationship and improve the
precision of TAS.
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